This is Edward LuttwakÂ’s third and arguably finest collection of essays. In a challenge to the intellectual backbone of those who write about peace as something one wishes into existence through mediation and good will, LuttwakÂ’s view of warfare is bracing: "An unpleasant truth, often overlooked, is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace." Luttwak articulates positions shared by military figures and political heroes who have their feet on the ground rather than in the sand. He shares his thoughts in essays covering America at war and the new Bolshevism in Russia, ranging in place from the Middle East to Latin America and stops along the way to Byzantium. Luttwak examines military reform, great powers grown small, and drugs, crime and corruption as part of the common culture of the West. Though his message is sometimes delivered in a light tone, he is never foolish and never trivial. Luttwak develops the bracing thesis that cease fires and armistices in states of war, while sometimes inconclusive, are lesser evils than prospects for a nuclear meltdown. Even in arenas of geopolitical antagonism, neither Americans nor Russians have been inclined to intervene competitively in wars of lesser powers. As a consequence, intermittent war persists; and greater dangers to the world are averted. It is no exaggeration to compare Luttwak to Clausewitz in the nineteenth century and Herman Kahn in the twentieth century. This volume deserves to be read and digested by all who would understand contemporary geopolitics....

In this book, the distinguished writer Edward Luttwak presents the grand strategy of the eastern Roman empire we know as Byzantine, which lasted more than twice as long as the more familiar western Roman empire, eight hundred years by the shortest definition. This extraordinary endurance is all the more remarkable because the Byzantine empire was favored neither by geography nor by military preponderance. Yet it was the western empire that dissolved during the fifth century. The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, by devising new ways of coping with successive enemies. It relied less on military strength and more on persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade threatening neighbors, and manipulate potential enemies into attacking one another instead. Even when the Byzantines fought—which they often did with great skill—they were less inclined to destroy their enemies than to contain them, for they were aware that today’s enemies could be tomorrow’s allies. Born in the fifth century when the formidable threat of Attila’s Huns were deflected with a minimum of force, Byzantine strategy continued to be refined over the centuries, incidentally leaving for us several fascinating guidebooks to statecraft and war.

The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire is a broad, interpretive account of Byzantine strategy, intelligence, and diplomacy over the course of eight centuries that will appeal to scholars, classicists, military history buffs, and professional soldiers.

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